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Abstract
The interbank market has a natural multiplex network represen-
tation. We employ a unique database of supervisory reports of Italian
banks to the Banca d’Italia that includes all bilateral exposures bro-
ken down by maturity and by the secured and unsecured nature of
the contract. We find that layers have different topological proper-
ties and persistence over time. The presence of a link in a layer is
not a good predictor of the presence of the same link in other layers.
Maximum entropy models reveal different unexpected substructures,
such as network motifs, in different layers. Using the total interbank
network or focusing on a specific layer as representative of the other
layers provides a poor representation of interlinkages in the interbank
market and could lead to biased estimation of systemic risk.
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1 Introduction
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, interconnectedness among players
in the financial system has become a major issue for regulators, as credit
exposures among financial institutions have been one of the main vehicles
of contagion during the crisis. The mapping of linkages among financial
institutions has therefore become an essential tool in assessing systemic risk
in the financial system.
Network analysis has contributed to characterize, understand and model
complex systems of interconnected financial institutions and markets (Gai
and Kapadia, 2010; Battiston et al., 2012). These tools are gaining popu-
larity also among policymakers. Most contributions focus on the interbank
market1, the plumbing of modern financial systems, especially in the Euro
area. In the network perspective, the interbank market is commonly rep-
resented as a standard directed and weighted graph. Each link represents
a credit relation between two counterparties. Directionality identifies the
borrower and the lender; the weight of the link represents the loan amount.
In general, the interbank market is much richer and complex than a simple
weighted graph. In this paper we explore the differences in credit relations
due to maturity of the contract or the presence of collateral. Due to lack of
data availability, existing empirical literature either (i) disregards the hetero-
geneity of credit relations or (ii) focuses only on one type, implicitly assuming
that the network of the selected type of credit relations is a good proxy for the
networks of other types. In the latter case, the vast majority of contributions
focus on the overnight unsecured market. These two approaches are parsimo-
nious but may provide biased results if the underlying “representativeness”
assumptions fail.
A much more accurate representation of the interbank market is a multi-
plex, or multilayer network. A multiplex (see Fig. 1) is composed by a series
of layers. Each node is a bank and each layer is a network representing one
type of relations. The total (or aggregated) network is the aggregation of all
the layers of the multiplex.
1See for instance Boss et al. (2004); Sorama¨ki et al. (2007); Iori et al. (2008); Cont et
al. (2011); Mistrulli (2011).
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Figure 1: Stylized representation of the multiplex structure of the interbank mar-
ket. Each node is a bank, and links represent credit relations. A layer (e.g.
overnight, repo market,...) is the set of all credit relations of the same type. The
network in red is the total interbank market, obtained by aggregating all the layers.
The general aim of this paper is to provide a broad analysis of differ-
ences and similarities between the layers of the interbank network. Our
main research questions are: (1) Are the layers of the multiplex topologically
different? (2) Is there a specific layer that leads the topological properties of
the total network? (3) Is the occurrence of a link in a layer predictive of the
occurrence of another link between the same nodes in a different layer or in
the same layer at a different time?
We employ a unique database of supervisory reports of Italian banks to
the Banca d’Italia. In brief, the dataset includes all bilateral exposures of all
Italian banks, broken down by maturity and by the secured and unsecured
nature of the contract. Moreover, we consolidate exposures at the banking
group level and infra-group lending is netted out.2
We perform three types of analysis to address our research questions.
2In what follows we provide evidence that the credit activity between banks belonging to
the same banking group (internal capital market), dramatically differ in its characteristics
and dynamics with respect to credit between banks belonging to different groups.
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First, we compare the topological and metric properties of the different lay-
ers and of the total network. Similarity of topology, however, does not imply
point-wise similarity. Therefore, the second set of analyses is aimed at quan-
tifying the similarity between the different layers by computing the joint
probability that a link between two nodes appears in more than one layer.
Finally, we investigate the extent to which different random models inspired
to the Maximum Entropy Principle fit with the layers of the multiplex.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: (i) Different layers of the
interbank network have several topological and metric properties which are
layer-specific, while other properties seem to be more “universal”; (ii) The
topology of the total interbank market is closely mirrored by the one of the
overnight market, while both are little informative about other layers; (iii)
Higher order topological properties, such as triadic structures or reciprocated
links, are explained by random models in some layers, but not in others;
(iv) Random models that jointly consider topological and metric properties
provide a close representation of the metric properties of different layers, as
long as the calibration of the model is layer-specific.
From a policy perspective, the heterogeneity of layers may be good news
for financial stability, as it is likely to slow contagion across participants in
the different layers of the market. The evidence that overnight unsecured
layer most closely mirrors the topological features of the overall network
should provide comfort to policymakers, as the overnight unsecured interbank
market is the focus of monetary policy operations in several jurisdictions.
Still, if policymakers and researchers alike were to target a specific segment
of the interbank network, they should be careful in adopting an analytical
framework based on the overall features of the network.
Relationship to the literature. Multilayer network is a quite new branch
of network theory and is becoming largely applied in many fields. While
almost all network research has been focused on the properties of a single
network that does not interact and depends on other networks, examples of
interdependent networks abound in the real world (Gao et al., 2011). Many
real-world networks interact with other networks. One may think of the
internet, the airline routes and electric power grids. Buldyrev et al. (2010)
find that interdependent networks become significantly more vulnerable to
contagion compared to their non-interacting sub-networks.
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The economic literature on multilayer network is definitely not large. In
general, our paper is related to several contributions that study the interbank
market. Most of the studies on the interbank market focus on contagion.
Cont et al. (2011) use a set of different kinds of inter-bank exposures (i.e.
fixed-income instruments, derivatives, borrowing and lending) and study the
potential contagion in the Brazilian market. Based on Italian data, Mistrulli
(2011) finds evidence that banks default hardly triggers a systemic crisis.
Iazzetta and Manna (2009) focus on Italian bilateral interbank deposits, in
order to investigate the centrality of the banks and the resiliency of the
system. Other studies contributed to this line of research making use of es-
timation techniques to reconstruct bilateral relationships (see Upper (2011)
for a complete survey). Montagna and Kok (2013) develop an agent-based
model with the aim to catch risks arising from different banks businesses.
In this case the network representation of the interbank market relies on a
multi-layered model that takes into account long- and short-term bilateral
exposures and common exposures to external financial assets. The authors
find that the interactions among the layers matter in amplifying the con-
tagion risk. As a byproduct, focusing on a single interbank segment can
underestimate shocks propagation. Abbassi et al. (2013) use an estimated
dataset of interbank exposures from Target 2 payment system and embed
network covariates into their econometric model. They estimate the impact
of the Lehman collapse on the Euro interbank market structure. Market
segments with different maturity have reacted in different ways. No decline
in volume is recorded in the overnight unsecured segment, while the term
money markets dropped after the Lehman bankruptcy.
Many other non-network papers attempt to evaluate the effects of the
financial crisis in different interbank market segments. Afonso et al. (2011)
analyze increased counterparty risk and liquidity hoarding in the US federal
fund market after the Lehman episode. Kuo et al. (2013) study the US term
interbank market, using both quantity and price information. The main
finding of the paper is a shortening in the maturity along with a reduction
in the volume exchanged around the Lehman crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our dataset. Section
3 is devoted to the comparison of the topological and metric properties of
the different layers. In Section 4 we present a similarity analysis. In Section
5 we investigate how statistical ensembles of networks are able to explain
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the structure of the different layers. Three technical appendices present the
mathematical tools used in our analysis.
2 Data description
We build a dataset of interbank transactions based on the supervisory reports
transmitted to Banca d’Italia by all institutions operating in Italy. Supervi-
sory information covers both locally incorporated banks and Italian branches
of foreign banks. We focus on information reported by lending institutions at
the time of the mapping of the network structure. Banks also report trans-
actions with foreign institutions. However, this information cannot be fully
employed in assessing the characteristics of the interbank network for several
reasons. Then, we focus only on domestic links.
Information refer to end-of-year outstanding balances. We focus on 5
observations starting from end 2008. Over this period, Italian banks experi-
enced the dry up of international interbank market that followed the Septem-
ber 2008 Lehman crisis as well as the impact of the Eurozone sovereign debt
crisis which, particularly since the fall of 2011, sharply reduced the amount
of interbank funds made available to Italian institutions due to sovereign risk
concerns by market participants. The response of the Eurosystem consisted
of liquidity injections, like other central banks worldwide, to alleviate tensions
in the money market. Extraordinary measures were introduced.3 Moreover,
a wave of regulatory interventions and proposals are affecting bank’s fund-
ing structure and the interbank market. As a major European country, Italy
and its interbank market have experienced this sequence of shocks and policy
interventions and represent a quite unique environment.
Most banks operate in Italy through a large set of subsidiaries as a result
of the consolidation process that took place in the 1990’s and the 2000s:
for example, the 5 largest groups - which currently account for some 60
per cent of the total banking assets - operate through some 55 subsidiaries.
3The most important are the fixed rate full allotment procedure, the supplementary
longer-term operations, the broadening of eligible collateral, two Covered Bond Purchase
Programmes and currency swaps with a number of major central banks. In addition,
two longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) with 36-month maturity were allotted
on 21 December 2011 and 29 February 2012, with a temporary widening of the collateral
framework.
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Distinguishing between intragroup and intergroup transactions is therefore
crucial. Since interbank lending and borrowing decisions are normally taken
at the parent company level, we assume that the relevant economic agents
of the network lie at the group level. We thus focus on data on intergroup
transactions consolidated at the group level. Still, internal capital markets
play a large role in the network, as funds managed by the parent company
are distributed among the group’s subsidiaries. We retain information on
intragroup contracts by modeling such transactions as self-loops, in which the
lending and borrowing institutions coincide. Network statistics are adjusted
by dropping such relationships whenever it is required by the definition of
the corresponding metric.
The representation of the interbank market is a weighted and directed
network, namely a set of nodes (banks) that are linked to each other through
different types of financial instruments (edges). The direction of the link goes
from the bank i having a claim to the bank j, and the weight is the amount
(in millions of euros) of liabilities of j towards i.
The availability of other information on interbank transactions shapes
the nature of our multi-layer analysis in which we focus on the breakdown
of the network by contract type and maturity. The most relevant types of
transactions recorded include overnight, sight and term deposits, certificate
of deposits and repurchase agreements. For the sake of simplicity we only
distinguish between unsecured and secured transactions, while we retain in-
formation on the maturity of unsecured contracts by distinguishing between
overnight, short term (up to 12 months excluding overnight) and long term
transactions (more than 12 months). We remark that our data on secured
transactions only refer to OTC contracts, while the vast majority of secured
transactions take place on regulated markets and are centrally cleared.
The Italian financial system is bank-based and the Italian Interbank Net-
work (IIN) is one of the largest in the Euro area. Table 1 reports end-of-
period outstanding amounts. The top panel refers to non-consolidated data
that include intragroup lending. Consolidated data, netted out of intragroup
transactions are reported in the bottom panel. A very large fraction of the
interbank network is due to intragroup lending (more than 80% on average);
moreover, a big drop in intragroup volumes is reported in 2010, due to the
merging of several subsidiaries of a major group. The observed large differ-
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ences between the two panels of Table 1 confirm that non consolidated data
would offer a blurred picture of the network of market transactions.
Layer 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Unsecured overnight 185 147 71 68 79
Unsecured ST 157 192 97 97 81
Unsecured LT 68 110 95 102 103
Secured ST 74 39 43 65 36
Secured LT 0.1 8.0 0.8 2.5 4.9
Total 485 497 308 336 306
(a) Non consolidated data (intragroup lending is included)
Layer 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Unsecured overnight 22 19 16 17 19
Unsecured ST 26 27 13 14 12
Unsecured LT 6 3 7 17 28
Secured ST 15 5 17 11 6
Secured LT 0.03 0.3 0.7 0.6 1,4
Total 70 55 54 61 68
(b) Consolidated data (intragroup lending is excluded)
Table 1: Domestic credit exposures in the Italian interbank market. Billions of
euros. End-of-period outstanding amounts.
Looking at consolidated data, after a decline of 25% from 2008 to 2010,
the 2012 figures are close to those of 2008. The overnight interbank market,
quite often at the core of network analysis, is responsible for roughly one
third of the total volume. The time dynamics of the outstanding amounts
in different layers are very heterogeneous, In particular, from 2010 we ob-
serve a decline in the unsecured short-term layer, mirrored by an increase of
unsecured long-term lending. The surge of long-term interbank activities is
consistent with incentives embedded in the recently established requirements
on liquidity risk. Indeed, the Basel Liquidity Coverage Ratio significantly
encourages borrowers to lengthen the maturity of their liabilities. The push
towards long-term maturities also mirrors the shift of interbank lending from
a money market, risk-free activity to a credit-intensive one, as a result of
repeated bank failures and seizures during the financial crisis.
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The drop in secured interbank lending is mostly due to regulatory in-
centives towards centrally cleared as opposed to over-the-counter repurchase
agreements, which turns into increasing costs of establishing bilateral lending
agreements. Nevertheless, a number of banks are keen on keeping trading on
a bilateral basis for the purpose of diversifying their funding sources.
3 The Multiplex Italian interbank market
The topological and metric properties of the Italian Interbank Network (IIN)
in the 2008-2012 period are investigated by comparing the properties of the
total network - resulting from the aggregation of all the layers of the multiplex
- with those of individual layers. Our time interval covers the early stage of
the financial crisis, the Euro zone sovereign debt crisis and the following ECB
extraordinary interventions.
We start by providing a comprehensive set of network metrics for the
total network and for each layer (see Appendix A for the definitions of the
metrics). Table 2 summarizes some results. Existing empirical works (Boss
et al., 2004; Iori et al., 2008; Cont et al., 2011; Fricke and Lux, 2012; Bech
and Atalay, 2008) detect some statistical regularities in interbank networks:
(i) sparsity and low average distance between nodes, (ii) heterogeneity of
nodes’ degree, often associated with a power law tail distribution of degree
with a small exponent (< 3), (iii) disassortative mixing, i.e. the tendency of
high degree nodes to connect with low degree nodes, (iv) small clustering,
and (v) heterogeneous level of reciprocity. As mentioned above, these studies
typically focus on the overnight market, as data are more easily available.
Alternatively, some contributions analyze the total network, in the aggregate,
without a detailed analysis at the layer level. According to our first very
simple analysis that follows, the total network and the overnight layers share
very similar topological properties; conversely, other layers have significant
differences in topology. A general implication is that systemic risk assessment
(e.g. contagion analyses) based on the total interbank market (i.e. missing
granularity of different layers) would exclusively reflect the properties of the
overnight segment. However, the latter is a very poor approximation of
other layers, which may be non-negligible in terms of size and, potentially,
for systemic risk assessment.
More in detail, the metrics of the total network are quite stable over the
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2008-2012 period. The number of banking groups slightly declines from 573 in
2008 to 533 in 2012. The network is very sparse (the density is approximately
1%), weakly completely connected and almost strongly completely connected.
The average path length is low, indicating a compact network structure.
Regarding individual layers, the figures of the overnight segment are very
close to those of the total network. Almost all banking groups that operate
in the total network also trade in the overnight market. This layer is almost
connected, both weakly and strongly. Similarly, the unsecured short-term
layer involves almost all banking groups, but it is characterized by a much
lower density. The increase in volume of the unsecured long-term layer (see
Table 1) is clearly associated with the rising number of banks operating in this
layer (from 238 to 450). It is much less dense than the overnight layer. The
strong component is far smaller than the weak component. The two secured
layers are much smaller in size as nowadays the majority of collateralized
trades are operated through Central Counterparties (CCPs). In particular,
the secured long-term layer is a very small network. The secured short-term
layer has less than 100 nodes.
One key stylized fact observed on real data is that interbank networks
have a scale free structure. Technically, scale-free networks are characterized
by a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of degree (or
weight) which is asymptotically described by a power law functional relation.4
The peculiarity of scale-free interbank networks is the relative abundance of
banking groups whose degree significantly exceeds the average: these “hubs”
explain a large portion of lending transactions. Figure 2 shows the log-log
plot of CCDF of in-degree and out-degree of the different subnetworks of the
IIN in 2012.
4A power law function is P (X > x) ∼ x−α, where α is the tail exponent.
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Statistics (2008) U OVN U ST U LT S ST S LT TOT
# of nodes 573 550 238 72 8 573
# of edges 2936 1457 354 125 7 3534
Density 0.8% 0.5% 0.6% 2.4% 12.5% 1.0%
Largest weak compon. 573 549 230 48 6 573
Largest strong compon. 498 333 27 14 1 528
Avg undir. path length 2.3 2.5 3.1 2.3 1.8 2.2
Avg dir. path length 2.4 2.7 2.4 1.9 - 2.3
Statistics (2012) U OVN U ST U LT S ST S LT TOT
# of nodes 532 521 450 45 18 533
# of edges 2560 1254 887 67 25 3235
Density 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 3.3% 7.9% 1.0%
Largest weak compon. 532 520 447 35 11 533
Largest strong compon. 456 375 165 16 3 513
Avg undir. path length 2.3 2.6 2.6 2.7 1.7 2.2
Avg dir. path length 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.5 1.3 2.4
Table 2: Summary statistics of network metrics of the aggregated IIN and its
layers in 2008 and 2012. U = Unsecured ; S = Secured; OVN = Overnight; ST =
maturity less than one year (in the unsecured segment, the overnight is excluded);
LT = maturity more than one year.
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Figure 2: Complementary cumulative distribution function of in-degree (left
panel) and out-degree (right panel) of the total IIN and of its layers. The plots
are in log-log scale.
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We find (i) a fat tail (i.e. non exponential) asymptotic behavior for total
network and for all layers; (ii) the tail exponent is similar across layers; (iii)
the degree distributions of the total and of the overnight networks are very
similar (especially for in-degree). We estimate the tail exponent α by using
the maximum likelihood method developed by Clauset et al. (2009), which
identifies both α and the power law region. The estimated values of α are
remarkably stable across layers and over time. The range of values of α is
[1.8, 3.5] with most values concentrated around α = 2.3. We also perform a
log-likelihood ratio test of power-law against lognormal. In the vast majority
of cases (layers and years), the power law hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Exceptions (lognormal preferred to power law) are observed for almost all
years in the out degree of the secured short term layer.
The Spearman correlation between degree and strength is used to test
whether very interconnected banks have also large size credit relations (Table
3). In all cases, a high and statistically significant correlation is obtained. In
the overnight market the correlation is much lower than in the other layers:
almost all banks operate in this segment which, in turn, drives the result of
the total network.
Layer 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
U OVN 0.4433 0.4755 0.4680 0.4933 0.5190
U ST 0.5974 0.6313 0.6300 0.5596 0.5906
U LT 0.9372 0.9172 0.9430 0.9530 0.9391
S ST 0.9119 0.9579 0.9972 0.9913 0.9339
Total 0.5564 0.5641 0.5355 0.5115 0.5192
(a) out-degree vs out-strength
Layer 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
U OVN 0.7332 0.7756 0.7050 0.6423 0.7081
U ST 0.9018 0.9009 0.9008 0.8053 0.7545
U LT 0.9134 0.8776 0.7373 0.4695 0.4939
S ST 0.9508 0.9115 0.6128 0.7816 0.8084
Tot 0.7562 0.7414 0.6972 0.5612 0.5066
(b) in-degree vs in-strength
Table 3: Spearman correlation coefficient between degree and strength (in and
out) of the nodes in the different layers of the IIN.
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Correlation is stronger in the (OTC) secured segment: the number of
institutions active in this market is quite limited compared to other layers,
as fixed costs of establishing bilateral lending agreements - such as ICMA
Global Master Repurchase Agreement - favor large over small transactions
and therefore big over small players. A similar case can be made for unsecured
long-term transactions, whereas in short-term unsecured markets big players
with high degree might exchange relatively small quantities with a large
number of small banks, thereby pushing correlation coefficients down.
Unlike many other socio-economic systems, interbank networks are ob-
served to be disassortative. A network is disassortative when high degree (or
weight) nodes tend to be connected to other high degree (or weight) nodes
less frequently than expected under the assumption of a random rewiring of
the network that preserves each node’s degree (or weight). Table 4 reports
the in- and out- assortativity in 2008 and 2012, considering both degree and
weight.
Date: 2008 U OVN U ST U LT S ST S LT TOT
Out-degree assort. -0.26** -0.40** -0.52** -0.43** 0.00 -0.27**
In-degree assort -0.34** -0.32** -0.35** -0.32** 0.15 -0.33**
Out-weight assort. -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.18* -0.21 -0.05**
In-weight assort. -0.03* -0.01 -0.06 -0.14 0.38 -0.06**
Degree reciprocity 0.43* 0.45* 0.10* 0.18* 0.14 0.47*
Weight reciprocity 0.43* 0.16* 0.05* 0.13* 0.04 0.29*
Date: 2012 U OVN U ST U LT S ST S LT TOT
Out-degree assort. -0.27** -0.40** -0.51 ** -0.17 0.06 -0.31**
In-degree assort. -0.42** -0.39** -0.38** -0.31* 0.12 -0.37**
Out-weight assort. -0.03 -0.05 -0.32** -0.16 -0.29 -0.11**
In-weight assort. -0.18** -0.04 -0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.07**
Degree reciprocity 0.40** 0.56** 0.31** 0.31** 0.05 0.45**
Weight reciprocity 0.20** 0.00** 0.01** 0.05* -0.00 0.07**
Table 4: In- and out-degree and weight assortativity of the Italian Interbank
Network in 2008 (top table) and 2012 (bottom table). The lower part of each
table shows the degree and weight reciprocity. One asterisk (two asterisks) denotes
statistical significance at 5% (1%) confidence level.
Figure 3 presents the average in-degree of neighbors of a bank as a func-
tion of its in-degree. The monotonically decaying behavior is a clear sign of
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disassortativity. All layers have similar assortativity properties.
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Figure 3: Relation between the in-degree (x-axis) of a node and the average degree
of its neighbors (y-axis) in 2012. The results for the total network are very similar
to the one for the overnight market and are not shown for the sake of clarity.
Table 4 also reports the results of the analysis of the reciprocity (degree
and weight) of the different layers of the interbank network. In general,
reciprocity is significantly higher in the overnight layer, especially considering
weights. The only exception is the degree reciprocity of the unsecured short-
term layer, which is also pretty high. However when one considers weights,
reciprocity drops significantly as compared with the weight reciprocity in the
overnight market. In general, many banks still hold bilateral deposit accounts
at other banks for the settlement of retail payments. These accounts may
be reported as overnight lending transactions even though they do not stem
from a credit decision by the bank. Reciprocity in the unsecured overnight
layer maybe therefore overestimated as a result.
Clustering is the tendency of the neighbors of a node to connect with
each other. Table 5 shows the average directed and undirected clustering of
the different layers. The coefficients for the total network are surprisingly
high. It is worth noting that most of the clustering is due to the overnight
segment, while other layers display much lower values. Even in this case,
clustering properties of the interbank market based on the overnight market
(or on the total interbank market) offer a partial picture of other layers.
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Date: 2008 U OVN U ST U LT S ST S LT TOT
Avg dir. clustering 0.393 0.112 0.056 0.161 0.135 0.463
Avg undir. clustering 0.527 0.170 0.083 0.180 0.270 0.571
Date: 2012 UOVN U ST U LT S ST S LT TOT
Avg dir. clustering 0.402 0.131 0.156 0.118 0.184 0.448
Avg undir. clustering 0.547 0.209 0.303 0.169 0.311 0.577
Table 5: Clustering coefficient (directed and undirected) of the different layers of
the IIN in 2008 and 2012.
Quite commonly, there is an inverse relationship between clustering and
degree. Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of the two coefficients for each layer.
The relatively high level of clustering is likely to be driven by the use of con-
solidated data, casting some doubt on the standard result of low clustering as
a fundamental property of interbank networks. Moreover, given the inverse
relationship between degree and clustering, the average value of clustering is
mostly determined by the contribution of low degree nodes. Thus the result-
ing value is determined, to a large extent, by the degree distribution of the
network. In order to correct this bias, in section 5 we focus on the number of
triangles (instead of clustering coefficients), obtaining very different results.
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k
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Figure 4: Scatter plot of the clustering coefficient of a node versus its degree in
2012. The results for the total network are very similar to the one for the overnight
market and are not shown for the sake of clarity.
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The clustering coefficient of hubs is very close to zero in most layers,
suggesting that hubs behave essentially as star centers in the network for
all layers other than the overnight one, through which hubs connect their
neighbors to other market participants.
4 Results from similarity analysis
In this section we focus on the stability of individual layers over time and
the similarity between different layers, at a certain point in time. In general,
two networks can have very similar topological properties but the existence
of a link between two nodes in one network may give no information on the
probability that the same two nodes are linked in the other network as well.
When the two networks are the realizations of the same layer at two different
instant of time, the similarity between the two is a measure of the stability
over time of the network structure of the layer. When the two networks of
the previous example are two layers of a multiplex, the similarity analysis
assesses to what extent a layer is representative of the other. Similarity
analysis is a relevant tool in assessing financial stability: diffusion properties
- and therefore contagion - in a multiplex depends on the similarity between
the layers (Gomez et al., 2013).
There are many ways to define network similarity. Appendix B reviews
shortly the main concepts put forward by the literature. All measures repre-
sent a network as an ordered vector. We use the Jaccard similarity J , defined
by eq. (11), for binary networks. Jaccard similarity can be interpreted as the
probability of observing a link in a network conditional on the observation
of the same link in the other network. Cosine similarity, defined by eq. 10,
is used instead for weighted networks.
Two layers must share the same set of nodes in order to perform similarity
analysis between them. In the following analysis, we either include only the
nodes which enter in both layers (i.e. we take the intersection of the two
node sets) or we include all nodes which enter in at least one layer (i.e. we
take the union of the two node sets).
Our results show that different layers display very different time persis-
tence. The topology of the overnight layer appears to be more stable, with
J values roughly around 70% between two successive years. The measure
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J progressively declines increasing the lag. The topological similarity is not
substantially affected by focusing only on common nodes (intersection in-
stead of union): the set of nodes that operate in this market is relatively
stable over time. The unsecured short-term layer is slightly less persistent
(J ≈ 60%) and still stable restricting to the intersection. Conversely, the
unsecured long-term layer is highly variable, especially in the union, with
J = 70% between 2008-2009 and between 2011-2012, and a much lower sim-
ilarity (J ≈ 40%) between the other consecutive years. Finally, the secured
short-term layer is quite volatile, both in terms of operating nodes and in
terms of links. In fact, the similarity between consecutive years drops from
40-50% to 20-30% when moving from intersection to union. Unsurprisingly,
similarity is lower when weights are added into the picture: cosine (metric)
similarity is consistently lower than Jaccard similarity and it is also more
volatile for all layers. Table 6 reports figures for the two most diverse layers.
2008 2009 2010 2011
2009 61%*
2010 35%* 42%*
2011 18%* 21%* 42%*
2012 15%* 17%* 32%* 70%*
(a) Unsecured long-term, J
2008 2009 2010 2011
2009 67%*
2010 53%* 61%*
2011 50%* 56%* 71%*
2012 44%* 48%* 60%* 69%*
(b) Unsecured overnight, J
2008 2009 2010 2011
2009 29%*
2010 15%* 16%*
2011 2%* 7%* 78%*
2012 1%* 3%* 62%* 89%*
(c) Unsecured long-term, cosine similarity
2008 2009 2010 2011
2009 30%*
2010 13%* 39%*
2011 15%* 47%* 52%*
2012 19%* 41%* 48%* 76%*
(d) Unsecured overnight, cosine similarity
Table 6: Jaccard similarity and cosine similarity of the same layer of the IIN in
different years. The tables refer to the union case. The asterisk denotes statistical
significance at 1% confidence level.
A trend towards a greater stabilization seems to arise, since in the lower
panels the values along the diagonals are increasing with time. In particular,
the cosine similarity of the unsecured long-term layer between 2010-2011 and
2011-2012 is exceptionally high. This corroborates the evidence of a shift on
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longer maturity, as highlighted in Table 1. The Jaccard similarity between
different layers at a certain point in time is relatively low. Considering the
intersection, J is around 15-20% and never exceeds 50%. This evidence sug-
gests significant complementarity between different segments of the interbank
market. The similarity between the overnight unsecured and other layers is
at most 30%, often around 15%, confirming that the overnight market is not
quite representative of the other layers. Similar results also hold for cosine
similarity.
Table 7 presents the results of the topological similarity of different layers
in 2008 and 2012. Furthermore, the former becomes higher if we restrict to
common nodes, meaning that a relatively large number of nodes is present
only in one of the two layers. Instead, the similarity between the unsecured
layers appears to be less affected by the switch from union to intersection. In
general, these results confirm that the network structure differs significantly
across different types of contracts.
S LT S ST U OVN U LT
S ST 18% (3%)
U OVN 12% (0%) 15%* (3%*)
U LT 5% (0%) 13%* (5%*) 12%* (6%*)
U ST 13% (0%) 16%* (4%*) 29%* (29%*) 19%* (10%*)
(a) 2008. Intersection, Union in parenthesis
S LT S ST U OVN U LT
S ST 26%* (15%*)
U OVN 11%* (0%*) 11%* (1%*)
U LT 0% (0%) 9%* (0%*) 22%* (17%*)
U ST 13%* (0%*) 11%* (1%*) 32%* (31%*) 31%* (28%*)
(b) 2012. Intersection, Union in parenthesis
Table 7: Jaccard similarity between different layers of the IIN in the same year.
The asterisk denote statistical significance at 1% confidence level.
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5 Results from null models
In this section we assess the ability of economically relevant null models to
explain the higher order topological properties of the IIN such as reciprocity,
clustering and assortativity. While these variables can provide relevant in-
sights in interpreting the interaction between the network nodes, their value
might depend more on the properties of the individual nodes rather than
on the properties of the overall network . For example, let us consider the
reciprocity concept: in Section 3 we found a reciprocity value of 0.45 for the
total network in 2012. Which value would we find if we allowed each bank to
retain the same number of lenders and borrowers as it has in reality, but to
randomly choose its counterparties? More generally, which patterns in a real
network are “unexpected” when one assumes that certain network properties
are preserved?
In order to answer these questions, we need to build suitable set of null
models that are maximally random but retain certain network metrics (in the
above example, the in- and out- degree of each node). The Maximum Entropy
Principle allows to define an ensemble of network realizations G and to give a
probability P (G) to each of the resulting networks. Specifically, one finds the
probability distribution of networks that maximizes entropy, by constraining
the average value of some network metrics {xi(G)}. Park and Newman (2004)
show how to build the maximum entropy probability distribution P (G) and
to solve for several set of constraints, both for weighted and binary networks.
Different constraints lead to different ensembles (and null models). Appendix
C provides a detailed explanation of the procedures we followed in building
network ensembles, taking advantage of Squartini and Garlaschelli (2011),
and applications to global trade (Fagiolo et al., 2013) and to credit networks
(Squartini et al., 2013).
It is useful to introduce the idea of a hierarchy of observables in a net-
work. First order properties of a network involve only linear combinations
of the elements of the adjacency or weight matrix. These properties include
connectivity and the degree distribution. Analogously one can define second,
third, etc. order properties (generically higher order properties) as those
metrics that involves sums of products of two, three, etc. elements of the
adjacency or weight matrix. The approach is thus to define the ensemble
by constraining some low order properties and to observe whether other low
order properties and high order properties of the real network are reproduced
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by the ensemble.
In this section we apply the maximum entropy principle to build three
ensembles, namely the Directed Binary Configuration model (DBCM), where
the in- and out-degree of each node is preserved, the Reciprocal Configuration
Model (RCM), where also the number of reciprocated relations of each node is
preserved, and the Directed Weighted Configuration Model (DWCM), where
we preserve the in- and out-strenght, as well as the in- and out-degree, of
each node. Among the properties we will test, we consider the number of
reciprocated links R (see Eq. 2, not for the RCM), the assortativity, the
number of triangles T (see Eq. 9). We will also consider some higher order
quantities such as the size of the weakly or strongly connected component
and the number of distinct triads or third order motifs, which are the 13
possible arrangements of up to six directed links among triples of nodes (see
top panel of Figure 5).
5.1 Directed Binary Configuration Model
The simplest ensemble we consider is obtained by a model of binary directed
networks in which the constrained observables are given by the in- and out-
degree sequence of nodes. Following the network literature, we label the
ensemble as the directed binary configuration model (DBCM).
For each layer5 and each year, we solve the extension to directed networks
of the system of Eq. (18) in order to obtain the parameters of P (G). Then we
simulate a large sample of artificial binary networks and compute the higher
order topological properties for each realization of the sample. In this way,
we are able to compute both the sample average and the p-values of these
properties that we compare with the values obtained in the real network. As
high order properties we consider the size of the largest weakly and strongly
connected component, the number R of reciprocal links, the number T of
undirected triangles, the assortativity, and the number of triadic structures.
The first results for two layers are shown in Table 8. Looking in the first
place at the overnight layer, we see that the selected high order properties of
the real network are highly unlikely for a member of the DBCM ensemble.
In particular, the size of the largest weak and strong components are much
larger than those expected under the null model. The real overnight layer has
5With the exclusion of the secured long-term layer which is too small to provide inter-
esting results.
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Largest weak component 573 565 556 551 532
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average 556 547 544 538 515
Largest strong component 498 486 511 501 456
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average 374 359 385 384 335
Reciprocal links 1,265 1,231 1,271 1,189 1,033
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average 855 814 843 820 677
Und. triangles 14,114 11,747 11,645 10,704 10,098
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average 18,418 16,252 15,953 14,871 13,755
(a) Unsecured overnight
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Largest weak component 48 48 135 67 35
(p-values) (0.098) (0.018) (0.000) (0.141) (0.039)
Simulation average 52 42 118 72 32
Largest strong component 14 11 10 17 16
(p-values) (0.033) (0.030) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average 11 8 7 9 9
Reciprocal links 44 44 37 55 42
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average 22 14 11 11 11
Und. triangles 222 132 114 111 72
(p-values) (0.313) (0.481) (0.001) (0.047) (0.274)
Simulation average 250 137 217 185 91
(b) Secured short-term
Table 8: High order properties of two layers of the IIN and the corresponding
p-values and average values obtained from simulations of the DBCM.
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also a high number of reciprocated links R, while the number of undirected
triangles T is lower than in the DBCM ensemble. These results are observed
also in the unsecured short-term and long-term layers (data not displayed),
and they are very stable over time. The results for the small secured short-
term layer appear instead to be noisier and less stable, with reciprocal links
being the only topological property which is always significantly higher than
in the DBCM.
A recent investigation of the Dutch interbank market in the period 1998-
2008 (Squartini et al., 2013) showed that a significant decline of R with
respect to the DBCM has anticipated the outbreak of the crisis. They also
found that the the number of reciprocated links is significantly smaller than
the number predicted by the model. On the contrary, our analysis, based on
the period 2008-2012, indicates that during the crisis the reciprocity of all
the layers of the IIN has remained quite stable and significantly above the
value expected under the DBCM. Clearly, with our dataset we cannot test
whether before the crisis the reciprocity was even higher.
Table 9 shows the results of the comparison of assortativity of the Italian
interbank layers with that of the DBCM. We see that the disassortative be-
havior is present also in the DBCM ensemble and that the sample averages
are close to the real values. This result is consistent with Fricke et al. (2013)
who claim that the assortativity of a network depends on its degree distri-
bution. However our approach shows that in many cases the real layers are
significantly more disassortative than expected under a null model preserving
the degree distribution. Thus it would be interesting to investigate the origin
of these small but significant deviations of disassortativity from null models.
Finally, we consider the frequency of triads. In Squartini et al. (2013),
authors proposed the use of relative frequency of triads with respect to the
expectation of null models as early warning signals of topological collapse of
the interbank market. Here we investigate the frequency of triads in different
layers of the IIN and we compare them with the DBCM. In the next sub-
section we will consider the reciprocal configuration model (RCM) as a null
model.
In order to use the same procedure for both null models, we employ the
software MFINDER which allows to detect network motifs of all orders and to
evaluate their frequency against the DBCM or the RCM6. In particular, for
6Available at http://www.weizmann.ac.il/mcb/UriAlon/. See also Milo et al. (2003,
2002). The random networks are obtained by rewiring the original links while keeping the
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Out-degree assortativity -0.2631 -0.2847 -0.2830 -0.2698 -0.2736
(p-values) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004)
Simulation average -0.2467 -0.2668 -0.2682 -0.2593 -0.2566
In-degree assortativity -0.3466 -0.3563 -0.3748 -0.391 -0.4201
(p-values) (0.003) (0.005) (0.015) (0.019) (0.003)
Simulation average -0.3273 -0.3366 -0.3587 -0.3738 -0.396
(a) Unsecured overnight
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Out-degree assortativity -0.5263 -0.5395 -0.4549 -0.5208 -0.5141
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.172) (0.236)
Simulation average -0.4330 -0.4394 -0.4199 -0.5007 -0.5013
In-degree assortativity -0.3511 -0.3929 -0.236 -0.4391 -0.3803
(p-values) (0.059) (0.021) (0.003) (0.023) (0.161)
Simulation average -0.3165 -0.3437 -0.1942 -0.4068 -0.3659
(b) Unsecured long-term
Table 9: Assortativity of two layers of the IIN and the corresponding p-values
and average values obtained from simulations of the DBCM.
each triad we compute the z-score, which is equal to the number of observed
triads minus the expected value observed from simulations and the result
is divided by the standard deviation. Large absolute values of the z-score
indicate that the triad is unlikely explained by the null model.
From Figure 5, which evaluates triads against the DBCM with the help
of z-scores, we see that different layers have different properties. In the
overnight layer most triadic structures are under-expressed, and in particular
most of those that contribute to the value of T (triads 5 and 9-12). We
observe that triad 8, which is the only one strongly over-expressed, is related
to the high value of R while at the same time does not contribute to T .
number of incoming edges, outgoing edges and mutual edges of each node. This approach
leads to an exact consistency with the constraints, as opposed to the average consistency
described in appendix C. Therefore we are building microcanonical ensembles rather than
(grand) canonical ensembles, as for the other properties. Although the two approaches
are exactly equivalent only in the limit of very large networks, the respective linking
probabilities converge very rapidly as the number of switches increase. For a detailed
comparison see Squartini and Garlaschelli (2011).
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Similar properties are exhibited by the unsecured short-term layer (left panel
of Figure 7) and by the total network (data not displayed), which again
reflects closely the properties of the overnight layer. The z-scores of the
unsecured long-term layer are instead unstable across years, with most triads
not clearly under- or over-expressed across the period, although we still find a
tendency to under-express triads 6 and 10-13, consistently with the low value
of T 7. In conclusion, this analysis highlights that the pattern of over- or
under-abundance of triads with respect to the DBCM is different in different
layers of the IIN. Also the time stability of these patterns appears to be quite
different in different layers.
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Figure 5: Top panel. The 13 triads. Bottom panels. Z-scores of the different
triads in two layers of the IIN with respect to the DBCM.
5.2 Reciprocal Configuration Model
As we have discussed above, reciprocity plays an important role that it is
not captured by the DBCM. This fact can have a significant effect on the
analysis of triads described above. In order to control for the effect of R on
the frequency of triads, Squartini et al. (2013) introduce a more complex null
7The small secured short-term layer exhibits similar properties.
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model, i.e. the reciprocal configuration model (RCM). In this ensemble R
takes on average the same value of the real networks under study.
In Figure 6, we present the z-scores of triads, for the same layers, eval-
uated against the RCM and obtained again by using again the software
MFINDER. Firstly, we observe that the z-scores decrease drastically for the
unsecured overnight layer with respect to the DBCM. As a consequence, the
under- or over-expression of triads turns out to be significant only in some
years. We regard this result as a consequence of the dependency of higher
order properties on lower order properties for this layer. The decline of z-
scores occurs also for the unsecured short-term layer (Figure 7), although in
this case we still observe a much stabler and pronounced deviations of triads
from the RCM. Additionally, in this layer the z-scores of triads are affected
in a very different way when we pass from the DBCM to the RCM: triads 1-4
become over-expressed while in the DBCM they are under-expressed; triads
5 and 7 get more distant from the null model; triads 6, 8-13 are fairly similar
to the DBCM. Regarding the unsecured long-term layer, we observe instead
no systematic decrease of the z-scores. In particular, the values for triads 3,
5-6, 8-12 are fairly unaffected, while triads 1,2,4 become under-expressed as
opposed to over-expressed. Only for the dyad 7 we observe some significantly
lower z-scores.
From these results we learn that the influence of dyads on triads is any-
thing but linear. We conclude that, while the RCM provides a better sta-
tistical representation of the topology of some real interbank layers than the
DBCM, it does not explain completely their third order properties. More-
over, as for the DBCM, the pattern of over- and under-expression of triads
as well as their time stability is quite different in different layers of the IIN.
5.3 Directed Weighted Configuration Model
In the remaining of this section we focus on a null model for weighted and
directed networks with given strength and degree distributions, which we call
the directed weighted configuration model (DWCM). The technical details
regarding this model are presented in the Appendix C. The main idea can
be summarized as follows. The standard ensembles for weighted networks do
not have a realistic topology, since the only constraints entering these models
are the values of the strength distribution. In particular, they have a much
higher connectivity than their real counterparts. Furthermore, as we have
seen from Table 3, in our layers the degree distribution is highly correlated
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Figure 6: Z-scores of the different triads in two layers of the IIN with respect
to the RCM. See the top panel of Fig. 5 for the correspondence between the
x-axis and the triads.
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Figure 7: Z-scores of the different triads in the unsecured short-term layer
with respect to the DBCM (left panel) and RCM (right panel). See the top
panel of Fig. 5 for the correspondence between the x-axis and the triads.
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with the strength distribution. Note that this correlation can appear only in
sparse networks, since in the limit of a dense topology all nodes converge to
the same degree value, regardless of their strength. By resorting to a model
where strengths and degree act jointly as constraints, we take into account
both the strength-degree correlation and the sparsity of the original network
8.
We generate the ensemble of networks and we consider the metric version
of some of the higher order properties considered above (see appendix A for
definitions). From Table 10 we see that the strength reciprocity is often ex-
plained by the null model, although there is some propensity of the overnight
layer to display larger values than the ensemble average while the opposite
holds for the long-term layer. To complete the picture, we find that the val-
ues of the other layers (not displayed) are substantially in line with the null
model. These results indicate that in the IIN the net exposure ∆ij = wij−wji
between couples of banks is mostly determined by their respective out- and
in-strengths. Instead, there is a clear orientation of layers (including those
not displayed) to be less disassortative than the null model, which may be
potentially of interest in terms of systemic stability. In fact, assortativity
in this case means that banks are more likely to have large credit (debt)
positions with banks which also have large credit (debt) positions, poten-
tially compounding the risk of contagion in case of default. In this sense,
our results can be interpreted as an indication that for a set of alternative
“realistic” network configurations the contagion risk could be reduced.
Finally, an important insight offered by the DWCM regards a widely
investigated property of credit networks, namely their core-periphery struc-
ture (Craig and von Peter, 2009; Fricke and Lux, 2012; van Lelyveld and
In ’t Veld, 2012). It is possible to show analytically that the subdivision of
nodes into a core, made of nodes highly connected with the other core mem-
bers as well as with peripheral nodes, and a periphery, made of nodes with
8From an economic viewpoint, it is useful to remark that strengths are not by them-
selves network variables, rather they reflect economic variables, such as the economic size
of nodes or their preferences. Thus we can argue in favor of an indirect connection be-
tween economic behavior and topology, which to might help to explain why, in a world of
heterogeneous agents facing unpredictable events, it is generally impossible to determine a
universal statistical law governing the degree distributions of different economic networks,
as well as of the same network over time (Section 3). This lack of universality supports the
modeling approach followed in this section, which does not require to make hypotheses of
this sort.
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Out-strength assortativity -0.0204 -0.0221 -0.0334 -0.0367 -0.0316
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average -0.1458 -0.269 -0.3016 -0.3328 -0.2711
In-strength assortativity -0.0378 -0.0528 -0.1551 -0.197 -0.1827
(p-values) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average -0.2739 -0.2527 -0.2817 -0.2623 -0.2543
Strength reciprocity 0.4325 0.1407 0.1157 0.0714 0.2070
(p-values) (0.000) (0.124) (0.498) (0.149) (0.004)
Simulation average 0.1929 0.1078 0.1158 0.0912 0.1334
(a) Unsecured overnight
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Out-strength assortativity -0.0674 -0.0328 -0.058 -0.1231 -0.3209
(p-values) (0.070) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average -0.2038 -0.1989 -0.2223 -0.4768 -0.4649
In-strength assortativity -0.0676 -0.0364 -0.0407 -0.0222 -0.0360
(p-values) (0.038) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)
Simulation average -0.2140 -0.3011 -0.1300 -0.2618 -0.2808
Strength reciprocity 0.0596 0.0079 0.0004 0.0058 0.0139
(p-values) (0.065) (0.202) (0.018) (0.000) (0.002)
Simulation average 0.0236 0.0530 0.0192 0.0346 0.0287
(b) Unsecured long-term
Table 10: High order properties of two layers of the IIN and the corresponding
p-values and average values obtained from simulations of the DWCM.
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no reciprocal connections, depends entirely on the degree distribution of the
network (Lip, 2011). Accordingly, from Figure 8 we see that a simulation of a
network from DWCM can display a clear core-periphery structure9. Since in
this model, and likewise in real credit networks, degrees are correlated with
strengths, which on their part are economically linked with bank size, we get
to the heuristic conclusion that the core-periphery subdivision is related to
the concentration of the credit market and not to some additional topological
property.
Figure 8: A realization of a random network from the DWCM of the unse-
cured long-term in 2009. Note that the direction of links is clockwise; the
size of nodes is proportional to their strength; the thickness of arcs is propor-
tional to their values; a darker color is associated to nodes with the largest
degree.
6 Conclusions
Network theory is increasingly employed for systemic risk assessment, as a
network topology and its dynamics are key in determining the likelihood and
the severity of contagion episodes. This work accounts for the complexity
9This is true also for DBCM networks, because the topology of the two ensembles is
identical.
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of modern interbank markets and provides a broad analysis of its different
segments (layers) over an interesting time lapse, as the 2008-2012 period fea-
tured several crisis episodes. Italian interbank markets responded in several
ways: while a significant shift from short term to longer maturities took
place, at the same time the domestic overnight money market displayed a
significant resilience.
Topological properties differ significantly across layers. The topology of
the overall network largely reflects the one of the unsecured overnight seg-
ment. In this layer, the persistence of credit relationships over time (the
probability that two banks have a link at time t provided that they had
a link at time t − 1) is significantly larger with respect to other segments,
while similarity across layers is notably low. Such results may provide an in-
put for future work on interconnectedness and contagion, as they might help
assessing the severity of data limitation cases. We also put forward a compre-
hensive analysis of random models for the estimation of linkages in interbank
markets: higher order topological properties (the so-called network motifs) of
some layers differ from those of a random network, suggesting sophisticated
network models might be needed to provide a comprehensive representation
of credit markets.
From a policy perspective, the heterogeneity displayed by different lay-
ers may be good news for financial stability, as it is likely to slow conta-
gion across institutions. Evidence that the overnight unsecured market most
closely mirrors the topological features of the overall (total) network should
provide comfort to policymakers, as the overnight unsecured interbank mar-
ket is the focus of monetary policy operations in several jurisdictions. Still, if
policymakers and researchers alike were to target a specific segment of the in-
terbank network, they should be careful in adopting an analytical framework
based on the overall features of the network.
A Appendix A: Network Statistics Definition
In order to represent interbank networks we refer to the graph G = (V,E),
where V is the vertex or node set, typically assumed to be a subset of N,
while E is the edge or link set, with E ⊂ N× N, where (i, j) = eij ∈ E can
eventually map onto a subset D of R. In this case w(eij) = wij ∈ D is said
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to be the strength of the link (i, j) and G is said to be weighted. If (i, j)
maps onto 0, 1 we say that the network is binary or unweighted. Further
we set n = |V | and l = |E|. We say that G is undirected or that it is a
graph if we suppose ei,j ≡ ej,i for each i, j ∈ V . Otherwise we say that G
is directed or that it is a digraph. In general, G may be represented by the
adjacency matrix A with elements aij = 1 if eij ∈ E and aij = 0 otherwise.
If G is undirected, A is symmetric. The strength between nodes may be
represented by the matrix W with elements wij. From our definitions we see
that a weighted network can be always projected onto a a binary network
by setting aij = 1 if wij > 0. Further, directed binary networks may be
symmetrized using the following update rule: aij ← aij + aji − aijaji.
The neighborhood of a node i is defined as the set ψ(i) of nodes such that
eij ∈ E for all j ∈ ψ(i) (the definition may be easily adapted for directed
networks). Then the degree ki is the cardinality of ψ(i). In digraphs we must
distinguish between the in-degree kini , i.e. the number of edges pointed to
some vertex, and the out-degree kouti , i.e. the number of edges pointing away
from it. By extension, the strength of a node may be defined as follows:
wi =
∑
j∈ψ(i)
wi,j (1)
with obvious extension to the directed case.
In directed networks, such as the interbank networks, it’s interesting to
measure the likelihood of double links (with opposite directions) between
nodes pairs. In the simplest form, the number of reciprocated links R is
given by the sum
R =
1
2
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
aijaji (2)
The preferred measure of reciprocity in the literature (Sorama¨ki et al.,
2007) is the correlation coefficient of A and AT :
ρ =
∑
i 6=j(aij − a¯)(aji − a¯)∑
i 6=j(aij − a¯)2
(3)
where a¯ is the average value of the entries of A. These measure may be
adapted easily to strengths:
ρw =
%w − w¯
ω − w¯ (4)
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where
%w =
∑
i 6=j wijwji∑
i 6=j wij
ω =
∑
i 6=j w
2
ij∑
i 6=j wij
(5)
We observe that, since reciprocity is defined only for i 6= j, selfloops are
dropped by construction when we compute this measure.
A network is said to be assortative if the degree of a node is positively cor-
related with the degree of its neighbors. Otherwise, it may be disassortative
or uncorrelated. The assortativity coefficient is essentially the Pearson cor-
relation coefficient of k between pairs of linked nodes. Alternatively, we can
capture assortativity by examining the average degree of neighbors of a node
with given degree. This value may be written as 〈knn|k〉 =
∑
k′∈D′ k
′P (k′|k),
where P (k′|k) is the conditional probability that a node with degree k points
to a node with degree k′. If 〈knn|k〉 is increasing in k, the network is assor-
tative.
A second set of measures is related to connectivity. The simplest example
is given by density which for directed graphs reads
d =
l
n(n− 1) (6)
Interbank networks are found to display low density, i.e. to be sparse.
A network is said to be sparse when |E|  |V |2. Sparsity is a fundamental
shared property of real networks. Sparsity cohabits with another very com-
mon property, i.e. the fact that most nodes in a network are connected by a
path made of consecutive links10. In this case we also say that G has a giant
component, meaning that most of the nodes lie on a single component. This
property is generally detected also in interbank network.
The distance dij between two nodes i and j may be defined as the shortest
(geodesic) path between i and j when i 6= j. If i and j are not connected,
we set dij = +∞. Then the average distance d¯ must be computed separately
for each of the connected components of G. For directed networks, dij is
computed on the symmetrized network (see above).
10A path in a graph is a sequence of vertices such that from each of its vertices there is
an edge to the next vertex in the sequence.Two vertices i and j are said to be connected if
G contains a path from i to j. A connected component is a maximal connected subgraph
of G.
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In a binary directed network the undirected clustering coefficient of a node
i is the standard clustering coefficient of its symmetrization:
ucci =
∑
h6=j(aij + aji − aijaji)(ajh + ahj − ajhahj)(aih + ahi − aihahi)
ki(ki − 1) (7)
Instead, the directed clustering coefficient of a node i in the same network
is defined as follows (Fagiolo, 2007)
dcci =
∑
h6=j(aij + aji)(aih + ahi)(ajh + ahj)
2(ki(ki − 1)− 2k↔i )
(8)
where ki is the total degree of i, i.e. ki = k
out
i + k
in
i and k
↔
i =
∑
j aijaji
is the number of bilateral links. Self-loops are excluded from both compu-
tations. Finally, the number of undirected triangles in a directed network,
which is used in sec. 5, may be defined, using the symmetrization rule intro-
duced above, as follows:
T =
1
3
∑
i
∑
j 6=h
[(aij + aji − aijaji)(ajh + ahj − ajhahj)(aih + ahi − aihahi)]
(9)
B Appendix B: Similarity Analysis Method-
ology
Generally speaking, different measures of similarity are convenient for differ-
ent types of analysis. For instance, we wish to have differentiated measures
for binary and numerical data. Since graphs can be represented in alter-
native ways, in network theory a variety of measures have been adopted to
measure network similarity, which borrow from different fields. A common
requirement is that the similarity measure s is related to a metric distance d
by some simple relation like s+ d = k for some constant k.
The most widely used similarity coefficients for valued vectors are the
cosine and the Pearson correlation coefficient. Cosine similarity is defined as
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cos(θ) =
p · q
‖p‖‖q‖ =
n∑
i=1
piqi√
n∑
i=1
p2i
√
n∑
i=1
q2i
(10)
This coefficient takes values in the interval [−1, 1] ([0, 1] if the vectors are
nonnegative). Here θ is the angle formed by q and p. Pearson correlation is
identical to the cosine of centered data. The main disadvantage of correlation
as a network similarity measure is that it assumes that the entries of the
data vector are equally distributed, while this might not be the case in a
network (see section 5). We might think to account for the heterogeneity of
nodes in the network by centering data with respect to the ME expectation
(22). We prefer instead to make our measure independent from distributional
assumptions, and consequently choose (10) as our similarity measure for
weighted data.
Regarding boolean data, the most widely used similarity measures are the
Jaccard similarity and Dice or Sørensen similarity. Given two binary vectors,
the Jaccard similarity is
J(p,q) =
|p ∧ q|
|p ∨ q| (11)
Here ∧ (∨) stands for the entry-wise maximum (minimum) of p and q.
Dice similarity D is related to J by the relationship D = 2J/(1 +J), but the
distance derived from D, differently from J , is not a proper metric.
In graph theory, the Edit distance is also used frequently. This metric has
the disadvantage of depending on imposition of rather restrictive conditions
over an unidentified cost function. Alternatively, the following similarity
coefficient has been proposed recently (Bunke and Shearer, 1998):
|G∗|
max(|G1|, |G2|) (12)
where |G| stands for the number of nodes of graph G, and G∗ is the max-
imal common subgraph between G1 and G2. The disadvantage of this ap-
proach is that finding G∗ is computationally expensive (Dehmer et al., 2006).
Furthermore, |G∗| may be largely determined from errors and distortion in
data, especially for weighted networks (Bunke and Shearer, 1998). Given
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the mentioned shortcomings of alternative similarity measures, we choose to
employ J as argued in section 4.
C Appendix C: Null Models Methodology
In this appendix we summarize briefly the methodology of Park and Newman
(2004). As stated in the main text (sec. 5), the average network observables
are defined in terms of statistics computed over the network ensemble. Since
the observables depend on network realizations, we weight the average against
the probability P (G) of observing a given realization G in the ensemble:
〈xi〉 =
∑
G∈G
P (G)xi(G) = x¯i (13)
Since the xi(G) are a given, we need to specify a parameter dependent
functional shape of P (G) in order to solve the system. By adopting the basic
concepts of equilibrium statistical mechanics we obtain a solution for this
task by maximizing the following Lagrangean:
L = S + λ(1−
∑
G
P (G)) +
∑
i
θi
(
x¯i −
∑
G
P (G)xi(G)
)
(14)
where S = −∑G P (G) lnP (G) is Gibbs entropy. By taking the f.o.c. we
obtain
lnP (G) + 1 + λ+
∑
i
θixi(G) = 0 (15)
Rearranging and taking antilogs:
P (G) =
e−H(G)
Z
(16)
where H(G) ≡ ∑i θixi(G) is the graph Hamiltonian which, thanks to
matrix representation of G, can be rewritten in terms of the matrix W or A,
and Z ≡ e(λ+1) is the partition function. From the normalization constraint
we easily obtain that Z =
∑
G e
−H(G). The model is solved when the values of
the parameters {θi}, which fully determine P , are obtained from the system
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(13). It is possible to show that, if we adopt the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribu-
tion (16), then the system (13) provides the maximum likelihood estimates
for the parameters {θi} (Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2008).
When the constrained observables are the degree values {k1, . . . , kn} of a
binary symmetric network, the main quantities of the model read:
H(G) =
∑
i
∑
j>i
[(θi + θj)aij] =
∑
i
∑
j>i
Λijaij
Z =
∏
i
∏
j>i
(
1 + e−Λij
)
F = − lnZ = −
∑
i
∑
j>i
ln
(
1 + e−Λij
)
and P (G) takes the form of the product of n2 independent Bernoulli
variables with parameters
pij = 〈aij〉 = ∂F
∂Λij
=
1
eΛij + 1
i, j = 1, . . . , n (17)
Substituting the last equation into the constraints we obtain the following
specialization of system (13):∑
j 6=i
1
eΛij + 1
= k¯i i = 1, . . . n (18)
This system can be solved numerically in order to obtain the values θi
which satisfy the constraints.
The corresponding system for weighted networks with given average strength
distribution reads as follows:∑
j 6=i
1
eΛij − 1 = w¯i i = 1, . . . n (19)
In this case we obtain that the wij are geometrically distributed. Unfor-
tunately this ensemble has two main drawbacks: 1) the system (19) is hard
to solve; 2) even if a solution is obtained, the topology of networks in this
ensemble is not bound to follow any topological property, such as the degree
distribution or even connectivity. To put it short, the topology of this model
is unrealistic by construction.
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In order to overcome the first problem, a different maximum entropy
technique is usually employed in the analysis of weighted networks, such as
credit networks (Mistrulli, 2011). Following this approach, in the symmetric
and weighted case, we wish to solve the following problem 11:
max
W
g (W ) = −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
wij lnwij (20)
subject to the following constraints:
n∑
j=1
wij = w¯i i = 1 . . . n (21)
where w¯ = {w¯1, . . . , w¯n} is a fixed strength sequence. It is well known
that, when selfloops are allowed12, the solution of this problem can be written
down explicitly
w¯ij =
wiwj
v
(22)
We see from problem (20) that this solution represents the most diver-
sified configuration which is consistent with the given constraints. In the
standard economic perspective, this property is convenient since microeco-
nomic considerations dictate that the more diversification, the better for
economic agents (Allen and Gale, 2000). In order to derive an ensemble for
this configuration, we still need to assume a probability distribution for wij.
Some common choices are the the Poisson distribution (Karrer and Newman,
2011), or the binomial distribution (Bargigli and Gallegati, 2011).
The second problem is tackled rigorously in Garlaschelli and Loffredo
(2009), but the resulting models are in general difficult to solve numerically.
For this reason here we adopt a less rigorous approach, and proceed to solve
numerically the following system in the set of variables {x1, . . . , xn}:∑
j 6=i
xixj
1
eΛij + 1
= w¯i i = 1, . . . n (23)
11The extension to the directed case is straightforward.
12When they are not, we can easily obtain a numerical solution starting from the explicit
formula mentioned in the text.
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Here the Λij stand for the resolutive values of the system (18). Then we
treat the weighted links of artificial networks in the ensemble as the product
of two independent variables:
wij ∼ Bernoulli(pij) Poisson(λij) (24)
with pij obtained from (18) and λij = xixj obtained from (23). It’s easy
to see that the ensemble obtained in this way satisfies simultaneously the
constraints over degrees and strengths distributions.
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